This paper investigates the problem of inference channels that occur when database constraints are combined with non-sensitive data to obtain sensitive information. We present an integrated security mechanism, called the Disclosure Monitor, which guarantees data con dentiality by extending the standard mandatory access control mechanism with a Disclosure Inference Engine. The Disclosure Inference Engine generates all the information that can be disclosed to a user based on the user's past and present queries and the database and meta-data constraints.
Introduction
Information security policies in databases aim to protect the con dentiality (secrecy) and the integrity of data, while ensuring data availability. In Multilevel Secure (MLS) Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMSs) direct violations of data con dentiality are prevented by mandatory access control (MAC) mechanisms, such as those based on the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model. Mandatory policies are expressed via security classi cation labels, assigned to subjects, i.e. active computer system entities that can initiate requests for information, and to objects, i.e. passive computer system repositories that are used to store information. Classi cation labels, e.g., unclassi ed, con dential, secret, top-secret, form a mathematical lattice structure with a dominance relation among the labels. MAC policies control read and write operations on the data objects based on the classi cation labels of the requested data objects and the classi cation label (also called clearance) of the subject requesting the operation. For example, BLP policy ensures that a subject can read an object only if the subject's classi cation label dominates the object's classi cation label (simplesecurity property) and that a subject can write an object only if the object's classi cation label dominates the subject's classi cation label (star-property). However, MAC policies do not completely guarantee information secrecy. Illegal data accesses via inference channels may occur even if a properly functioning mandatory access control mechanism is present.
Covert channels are outside the scope of this paper.
The detection and removal of inference channels are vital steps in providing secure database systems.
Database integrity constraints, such as functional, multi-valued and join dependencies, are especially important from the perspective of generating inference channels. Moreover, metadata that can be expressed by general Horn-clause constraints can also generate inference channels. The following example, which is similar to the one presented by Su and Ozsoyoglu 16] , illustrates an inference channel via functional dependency. Let (NAME, RANK, SALARY, EXPERIENCE) be a relation schema, and assume that the relation Employee over this schema satis es the functional dependency RANK ! SALARY. The security requirement is that only users with top-secret security clearances can access information about salaries of employees; i.e., users with secret or lower security clearances cannot access tuples with values for attributes NAME and SALARY. This classi cation scheme allows users with secret or lower security clearances to separately access these attributes, thus supports data availability. However, while security violations via direct data access are prevented the database still can be compromised by indirect data access. To see this, assume that a user u with secret security clearance requests the following two queries: \List the RANK and SALARY of all employees" and \List the NAME and RANK of all employees." None of the queries violates the security requirement because they do not contain the top-secret <NAME,SALARY> pair. But clearly, because the relation Employee satis es the functional dependency RANK ! SALARY and the user knows the < RANK; SALARY > pairs, the user can infer the salary of the employees.
Contributions
In this paper, we present an integrated security mechanism, called the Disclosure Monitor (DiMon) (see Figure 1 ), which guarantees data con dentiality by extending a mandatory access control mechanism (MAC) with the Disclosure Inference Engine (DiIE). After a user's query is received, MAC enforces the standard security policy by allowing the user to read only the data that is dominated by the user's security clearance. If a security violation is detected, i.e. the requested data has higher security classi cation than the user's, the query is rejected. If direct security violation is not detected, the query is submitted to DiIE for further evaluation. DiIE generates all the information that can be disclosed by the user, based on the user's past and current requests and the database constraints. Then, the disclosed information is returned to MAC to be reevaluated. If no security violation is detected at this point, the query is answered and the user's history-le is updated.
The technical core of the paper introduces and studies the fundamental notions of datadependent and data-independent disclosures. While motivated by our DiMon architecture, the developed notions of disclosure and their inferences are orthogonal to speci c security architectures, and, in fact, are applicable to a wide variety of (both design and query-time) security frameworks. We develop a Disclosure Inference Engine that operates in two modes.
In data-dependent mode, the actual answers P 1 ; : : : ; P n to the user's past and present queries Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n and the constraints D are considered to generate the disclosed facts. In dataindependentmode, only the past and present queries Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n (without the actual data items) and the constraints D are used to generate new queries which are disclosed.
We say that a fact PF (over a query Q) is data-dependently disclosed from query answers P 1 ; : : : ; P n (to queries Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n respectively) by a set of constraints D if PF is guaranteed to be in any relation r such that (1) r satis es D and (2) P 1 ; : : : ; P n are the answers to the queries Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n on r. While the data-dependent mode provides the highest availability of data, it is computationally expensive and requires large storage overhead for maintaining a history-le. Disclosure can also be considered based solely on (past and current) queries, but independently of the (past or current) disclosed data. More speci cally, a query Q is data-independently disclosed from queries Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n by a set of constraints D if there exists an example of data-dependent disclosure corresponding to queries Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n , Q, and D. (Formal de nitions and properties of data-dependent and data-independent disclosure inferences are given in Sections 3, 4, and 5.) Data-independent disclosure is computationally less expensive and requires less storage overhead than the data-dependent disclosure, but it may indicate disclosures which are not present in a given database instance. However, without knowing the actual data, data-independent disclosure is the best one can achieve.
Our work is the rst, to the best of our knowledge, that introduces a formal classi cation of disclosure inference algorithms by the properties of completeness and soundness. The completeness property ensures that the algorithm generates all of the disclosed information, thus no possible inference remains undetected. The algorithm is sound if the generated information (actual data in data-dependent mode and queries in data-independent mode) is indeed disclosed. Intuitively, soundness along with completeness, provides the highest data availability without violating security. While it is desirable to develop algorithms that are both sound and complete, completeness is clearly more crucial than soundness from the perspective of data con dentiality. Without formal properties of disclosure inference, such as soundness and completeness, the strength of disclosure inference algorithms, in terms of providing availability of data and con dentiality, cannot be formally established.
We develop sound and complete disclosure inference algorithms for both data-dependent and data-independent modes. More speci cally, we consider selection-projection queries of the form Y C , where C is a conjunction of equalities among attributes and constants.
Furthermore, we consider a rich family of Horn-clause constraints, which are the extensions of (full) generalized dependencies 19] with constants.
For the data-dependent disclosure, we assume that disclosed items (i.e., security-labeled objects) may include speci c (partial) tuples, attribute sets, equality-based selection conditions or their combinations, and prove that the problem of disclosure inference is decidable. Moreover, we develop a disclosure inference algorithm (Algorithm 3) that, we prove, is both sound and complete.
For the data-independent disclosure, we assume that the disclosed items are selectionprojection queries, in which selection conditions are equalities, and prove that the problem of disclosure inference is decidable for the case when the selection conditions in queries and the constraints do not contain constants. Furthermore, for this case, we provide a sound and complete disclosure algorithm (Algorithm 4) that generates the set of data-independently disclosed queries. Moreover, we develop a general disclosure inference algorithm (Algorithm 5) that works without the above restrictions and is guaranteed to be complete.
Related Works and Their Limitations
Most of the inference channels in relational databases are raised by combining meta-data (e.g., database constraints) with data in order to obtain information that has higher security classi cation than the original data(see 8] for a survey). Techniques to detect and remove inference channels can be organized into two categories. The rst category includes techniques that detect inference channels during database design; any channels are removed by modifying the database design and/or by increasing the classi cation levels of some of the data items 2, 6, 7, 12, 17, 9, 13, 14, 16, 3, 4] . These techniques often result in over-classi cation of data and, therefore, reduce the availability of data. Techniques in the second category seek to eliminate inference channel violations during query time 5, 11, 15, 18] . If an inference channel is detected, the query is either refused or modi ed to avoid security violations.
Each of the categories above requires either data-dependent or data-independent inference algorithms. However, none of the above works has the formal notion of soundness and completeness for data-dependent and data-independent disclosure, and thus cannot establish these formal properties of disclosure inference. Also, most authors 2, 6, 13, 14, 11, 15, 18] , with the exception of 5, 7, 16, 3, 4] , do not consider the problem of actual inference for speci c families of constraints (and its decidability, soundness, completeness, etc.); rather they develop a framework, assuming that disclosure inference algorithms are readily available. It is our view, however, that the main technical di culty of solving the inference channel problem lies in developing (sound and complete) inference algorithms, especially for the data-independent case.
The work of Su and Ozsoyoglu 16] is the closest to ours in that they consider inference algorithms for speci c constraint families, namely functional and multi-valued dependencies. However, their inference methods are limited in several respects. First, as the source of illegal inferences, they consider only two types of dependencies, FDs and MVDs; inference algorithms are given for each of the two types separately, but not when they are present together. Whereas, our methods apply to Horn-clause constraints which are more expressive than the combination of FDs and MVDs. Second, they use single-attribute security granularity for FD-compromise and tuple-level security granularity for MVD-compromise. In contrast, we propose a exible security classi cation schema that can also express contentand context-based security granularity, including selection-projection queries and arbitrary sets of (partial) tuples. While their inference algorithms seem to be sound and complete for single-attribute level security granularity, it would not be sound even for security granularity based on sets of attributes. Since their solution for eliminating a detected inference channel is based on increasing the classi cation level of individual attributes (i.e., single-attribute level granularity), it restricts the availability of data.
Finally, the scheme recommended by Su and Ozsoyoglu is database design-time-oriented rather than query-time-oriented, as in the case of DiMon. While design-time approach is easier to manage and implement, query-time approach allows more availability of data than design-time approach because more information (i.e., past and current data/queries) can be used for disclosure inference. Our disclosure inference algorithms are readily available to both design-and query-time schemes (of cause, only data-independent disclosure is relevant to the design-time approach.) NAME 
Organization of Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de nes the subjects and the objects and how security classi cation labels are assigned to them in our model, and contains the algorithm used by DiMon. Section 3 de nes the database constraints that form the basis of data disclosure, and introduces the notions of data-dependent and data-independent disclosures. The disclosure inference algorithms for both modes are given in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides future research directions. Due to space limitation, proofs of all propositions can be found in 1].
2 Disclosure Monitoring Architecture 2.1 Data, Queries, and Security Classi cation
Our model is built upon lattice-based access control, therefore, it is necessary to de ne what the objects and the subjects are and how to assign security classi cation labels to them. For simplicity, we assume that users and subjects, executing in behalf of these users, are the same entities, thus we use the terms user and subject interchangeably. To formally de ne objects, we need the de nition of projection facts, queries, and their combinations, as given below. We consider selection-projection queries of the form Y C , where Y denotes the projection of a relation on attributes Y , and C denotes the selection condition of the query, where C is a conjunction of equalities of the forms A = B or A = c, such that A; B are attribute names and c is a constant. We assume the existence of a single, \universal" relation r with schema R. The symbol R is used to indicate both the relation name and the set of all its attributes. In our model, it is possible to express complex security requirements dealing not only with content-and context-based security restrictions but di erent security granularity also, as demonstrated in the following example. is over Y and satis es C.
QA-pairs are used as security labeled objects. Speci cally, an object in our security model can have one of the following forms:
1. An atomic QA-pair (P F; Y C ). 3. A set of atomic QA-pairs. As a security labeled object, a QA-pair (P; Y C ) will be interpreted as the set f(PF; Y C ) j PF 2 Pg and a set of QA-pairs f(P 1 ; Y 1 C 1 ); : : : ; (P n ; Yn Cn )g will be interpreted as f(PF; Y i C i ) j 1 i n; PF 2 P i g. We will also use the shortcut Y C (r) for (P; Y C ), where P = Y C (r), as well as Y (r) for Y TRUE (r) and C (r) for R C (r). Furthermore, in data-dependent mode Y C will be interpreted as Y C (r), where r is the current database relation;
i.e., all QA-pairs of Y C (r). the access control mechanism has to guarantee that the users cannot access objects unless their security clearance is greater than or equal to the security classi cation of the objects; i.e., (user) (object). Because O does not necessarily contain all of the objects that may be requested by the user, we need to describe a mechanism that detects whether the objects, that are currently requested or previously received by the user, disclose objects in O for which the user is not authorized.
Disclosure Monitor
Disclosure Monitor (DiMon), presented next, is an enhancement of the standard mandatory access control mechanism with a Disclosure Inference Engine to protect against inference channels that result from database constraints (see Figure 1 ). Algorithm 1, given in Figure 2 describes the steps followed by DiMon. Note that the user's id, given to the algorithm as an input value, may refer to a particular user or to a group of users sharing the same security clearance. We illustrate the functionality of DiMon by the following example. Example 2.1 Consider again the relation schema (NAME, RANK, SALARY, EXPERI-ENCE) and the relation Employee (see Table 1 ) that satis es the functional dependency RANK!SALARY. The security requirement is that only users with top-secret security clearances can access the salaries of the employees; i.e., ( NAME;SALARY ) =top-secret. In the data-dependent mode, the relation Employee is used by DiIE.
Assume that a user u with secret clearance has already received the answer to the query SALARY RANK=Clerk (Employee), which is < 34; 000 >. When representing the information revealed to the user, in both data-dependent and data-independent mode, besides the actual data values that were returned to the user, we also represent information contained in the selection conditions of the queries. For example, while the previous query only returned the value for the SALARY, the user also knows that this is the salary of the employee who is a clerk. Therefore, the user's history le in the data-dependent mode contains the QA-pair (R RANK = Clerk; SALARY = 34; 000]; RANK;SALARY ) and in the data-independent mode the query RANK;SALARY RANK=Clerk .
Next, suppose that u requests the query NAME;RANK EXPERIENCE=10 (Employee):
According to our algorithm, DiMon rst veri es if there is a direct security violation. Because tuples over NAME and RANK are classi ed as secret, there is no security violation detected. DiMon next checks for possible indirect security violations. First, a set O 0 is constructed.
1. In the data-dependent mode O 0 = f( NAME;SALARY (Employee); NAME;SALARY )g, thus the set of all atomic objects (QA-pairs) is A(O 0 ) = (fR NAME = Brunnel; P:; SALARY = 34; 000]; NAME;SALARY ); : : : ; R NAME = Smith; R:; SALARY = 28; 000]g; NAME;SALARY ) Next, the answers to the current and previous queries and the FD are used to determine if any of the atomic objects in A(O 0 ) are disclosed. Table 2 summarizes the answers to the rst ( rst tuple) and to the second queries (second tuple). Note, that the i s represent unique null values; i.e., values that the user does not know. Using DiIE, it is determined that no atomic object in A(O 0 ) is disclosed. Intuitively, this happens in the example because the two answered tuples have di erent values for attribute RANK, and, therefore they cannot be combined by using the FD.
2. In the data-independent mode O 0 only contains the query NAME;SALARY , thus A(O 0 ) = O 0 . Next the user's previously answered queries, the current query, and the FD are submitted to DiIE. Here, it is determined that the object NAME;SALARY is disclosed from the queries SALARY RANK=Clerk , NAME;RANK EXPERIENCE=10 , and the FD. Intuitively, without knowing the actual data, there exists an example (of data) which constitutes a data-dependent disclosure. For example, if the employee Hammer, W. was a clerk, then the answers to the two queries would be as given in Table 3 . From these answers, by using the FD, users could infer that Hammer's salary is $34,000. Table 3 : Example for data-independent disclosure.
Database Constraints and Data Disclosure
In our model database constraints form the basis of data disclosures. In this paper we consider Horn-clause constraints which are de ned as follows.
De nition 2. Equality of the form a i = a j , where each a i is either a constant or a variable that must appear in p 1^: : :^p n . In this case the constraint is called equality-generating. We will refer to p 1^: : :^p n as the body and to q as the head of the constraint. We require, that all the variables of q appear in the body. We will use the shorthand p 1^: : :^p n ! q for Since the relation r over R can be viewed as a set of projection facts of type R, we can also speak of d being satis ed by r. In the following, we restrict ourselves to constraints which can be represented in Horn-clause forms with equalities. We can now formally de ne the notion of data-dependent disclosure.
De nition 3.4 (Data-dependent disclosure) Let D be a set of database constraints, P 1 ; : : : ; P n be sets of projection facts over attribute sets X 1 ; : : : ; X n , and PF be a projection fact over Y .
We say that the set of QA-pairs P = f(P 1 ; X1 C1 ); : : : ; (P n ; Xn Cn )g discloses (P F; Y C ) in data-dependent mode, denoted as P j = D (P F; Y C ), if for every r over R that satis es D, P i X i C i (r) for all i = 1; : : : ; n implies PF 2 Y C (r). Given a set S of atomic QA-pairs, we say that P j = D S if for every (atomic) QA-pair (P F; Y C ) 2 S, P j = D (P F; Y C ). Finally, we denote by (P F; Y C ) j = (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) the disclosure f(PF; Y C )g j = D (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ), where D is empty. In this case, we say that (P F; Y C ) data-dependently dominates or simply dominates (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ).
Note that throughout the paper we use j = to denote both data-dependent disclosure when D is empty as well as to denote logical entailment. The meaning of j = will be clear from its context. By the De nition 3.4, if D is inconsistent (i.e., no relation satis es it) then everything is disclosed. The construction of data-dependent disclosure is computationally expensive and requires large storage overhead. Therefore, we introduce the notion of dataindependent disclosure, where only the queries are considered to detect whether an example of data-dependent disclosure can be found, that corresponds to the queries.
De nition 3.5 (Data-independent existential disclosure) Let D be a set of database constraints and X 1 C 1 ; : : : ; Xn Cn queries over R. We say that the set of queries P = f X1 C1 ; : : : ; Xn Cn g data-independently (or existentially) discloses the query Y C under D, denoted as P ; 9D Y C , if there exist (1) r over R that satis es D, (2) sets P 1 X 1 C 1 (r); : : : ; P n Xn Cn (r), and (3) PF 2 Y C (r), such that f(P 1 ; X 1 C 1 ); : : : ; (P n ; Xn Cn )g j = D (P F; Y C )
We say, that P ; 9D P 0 if for every Y C in P 0 , P ; 9D Y C . Further, P ; 9D Y will denote P ; 9D Y TRUE , and P ; 9D C will denote P ; 9D R C , where R is the set of all attributes of R. Also, we say that P ; 9D To solve the problem of existential disclosure, we also need the notation of universal disclosure, de ned as follows.
De nition 3.6 (Universal disclosure) Let D be a set of database constraints and X 1 C 1 ; : : : ;
Xn Cn queries over R. We say, that the set of queries P = f X1 C1 ; : : : ; Xn Cn g universally discloses the query Y C under D, denotes as P ; 8D Y C , if for every PF over Y C there exist (1) r over R that satis es D, (2) sets P 1 X 1 C 1 (r); : : : ; P n Xn Cn (r), such that f(P 1 ; X 1 C 1 ); : : : ; (P n ; Xn Cn )g j = D (P F; Y C ).
Similarly to the existential disclosure, we say that P ; 8D P 0 if for every Y C in P 0 , P ; 8D Y C . Further, P ; 8D Y will denote P ; 8D Y TRUE , P ; 8D C will denote P ; 8D R C , where R is the set of all attributes of R, and P ; 8D Note that, by De nitions 3.5 and 3.6, if D is inconsistent then nothing is disclosed. We study the interconnection between the existential and the universal disclosure in Section 5.
Data-Dependent Disclosure
In this section we develop an algorithm to construct a cover of all disclosed query-answer pairs under database constraints D from the set P of query-answer pairs. First we state the decidability result for the data-dependent disclosure.
Theorem 4.1 The following problem is decidable: Given a set D of database constraints and a set P of QA-pairs, 1. whether P j = D (P F; Y C ) for a given atomic QA-pair (P F; Y C ) 2. whether P j = D S for a given set S of atomic QA-pairs.
Theorem 4.1 will be a corollary to Theorem 4.2 that states correctness (i.e., soundness and completeness) of Algorithm 3 that computes a disclosure cover which is de ned in this section. To de ne disclosure cover, rst we need the following propositions. Proposition 4.1 Let (P F; Y C ) and (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) two QA-pairs, and let C e ; C 0 e be the selection conditions generated from C and C 0 , respectively, by extending them with the equalities explicitly given in PF and PF 0 . Then, 1. (P F; Y C ) j = (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) () C e j = C 0 e 2. data-dependent dominance is transitive, that is (P F; Y C ) j = (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) j = (P F 00 ; Y 00 C 00 ) ) (P F; Y C ) j = (P F 00 ; Y 00 C 00 )
Note that data-dependent dominance can be extended to QA-pairs that contain sets of projection facts. We say, that (P; Y C ) dominates (P 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) if for every PF 0 2 P 0 , there exists a PF 2 P such that (P F; Y C ) j = (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ).
Clearly, there may be di erent QA-pairs Q 1 and Q 2 that are equivalent in the sense that each dominates the other (i.e., Q 1 j = Q 2 and Q 2 j = Q 1 ). To provide a uniform representation of equivalent QA-pairs, we de ne the notion of normal forms of QA-pairs as follows:
De nition 4.1 (Normal form of a QA-pair) Given a QA-pair (P F; Y C ), its normal form, (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) is constructed as follows: Let C e be the selection condition constructed from C by extending it with all the equalities explicitly given in PF. Initially, PF 0 = PF; Y 0 = Y , and C 0 = C.
Step 1: For every attribute A i 6 2 Y 0 such that C e j = A i = c, where c is a constant, do:
(1) extend PF 0 over A i by adding A i = c, and (2) Add A i to Y 0 .
Step 2: For every equality A i = B 2 C 0 , where B is either a constant or an attribute, such that A i 2 Y 0 remove A i = B from C 0 (i.e., C 0 contains only equalities not given explicitly in PF 0 ).
Proposition 4.2 Data-dependent disclosure is transitive, that is for any sets P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 of QA-pairs P 1 j = D P 2^P2 j = D P 3 ) P 1 j = D P 3
Clearly, h can be extended to work from the set S d of the symbols (i.e., variables and constants) of the constraint to the symbols of r. We will use the symbol h for this extended mapping as well.
De nition 4.4 (Application of dependencies) A dependency d is applied on a relation r by using an atom mapping h as follows: and the tuple (h(a 1 ); : : : ; h(a n )) is not in r, then add it to r. Now that the application of the dependencies is de ned, we can describe the chase process, which is a variation of the Chase de ned in 19]. Algorithm 2 for the chase process is given in Figure 3 . In order to preserve the information encapsulated in the selection conditions of the queries, we generate dependencies from them. These dependencies are then applied to the answers of the corresponding queries. Let C be a conjunction of conditions of the forms A i = A j or A i = c, where A i and A j are attribute names and c is a constant. We generate dependencies from each condition in C as follows: (1) For each condition A i = A j we create a dependency R A i = a i ; A j = a j ] ! a i = a j , (2) For each condition A i = c we create a dependency R A i = a i ] ! a i = c. Figure 4 shows Algorithm 3 that generates the data-dependent disclosure cover of a set P of query-answer pairs under dependencies D.
Theorem 4.2 (data-dependent disclosure) Algorithm 3 e ectively computes the data-dependent disclosure cover DDC D (P); i.e., the algorithm terminates and the computed S is (1) sound, (2) Proof:
First, Algorithm 3 must terminate since the applications of dependencies do not introduce new constants or symbols, and, therefore, there is only a nite number of tuples that can be generated. We need to show that the set S computed by the algorithm is (1) sound, (2) complete and (3) compact.
(1) Proof of soundness: Let S be the set produced by Algorithm 3. Because datadependent disclosure is transitive (Proposition 4.2), to prove soundness of S it is su cient to prove that every QA-pair (P; Y C ) in S is disclosed; i.e., P j = D (P; Y C ). This is based on the following claim:
Claim 1: For every relation r that satis es D there exist symbol mappings (preserving equalities and constants) from the tuples of the relations r i , r 0 i , and r 00 , which were generated by the algorithm in Step 1a, 1c, and 2 respectively, to the tuples of r.
Before proving Claim 1, we complete the proof of soundness. If inconsistency occurred in
Step 2 then, by Claim 1, there does not exist r that satis es D such that P i X i C i (r) for all i = 1; : : : ; m. Therefore, S = f(ALL; R TRUE )g is vacuously disclosed. If no inconsistency occurred then, by using Claim 1, every (P F; Y C ) generated in Step 3 of the algorithm is The only remaining part is Claim 2, which we prove by induction on the number of application of dependencies on r 1 . We know that originally, there is a symbol mapping from r 1 to r 2 and that r 2 satis es the dependencies DD. Assume 2. tuple-generating dependency of the form B 1 ; : : : ; B n ! R A 1 = a 1 ; : : : ; A n = a n ] and a new tuple (h(a 1 ); : : : ; h(a n )) is added to r k 1 . We de ne p k+1 as follows: (a) For the tuples in r k 1 , p k+1 coincides with p k . (b) For the new tuple, p k+1 ((h(a 1 ); : : : ; h(a n ))) = (p k (h(a)); : : : ; p k (h(a n ))) = t We claim, that t is indeed in r 2 . This follows from the fact, that r 2 satis es d k+1 and that p k preserves equalities and constants. This completes the proof of the soundness of the algorithm. Step 3 the algorithm should have produced a QA-pair q which dominates (P F; Y C ). Since, by construction of S in Step 4 of the algorithm, a created QA-pair q 0 2 S must dominate q, therefore, q 0 must also dominate (P F; Y C ). This completes the proof of completeness.
(3) Proof of compactness: is given by contradiction. Assume that S is not compact.
Clearly, by construction of (P F; Y C ) in Steps 3.a,b, and c, it is in normal form. Also, by step 4c, C is non-redundant. But then, there is a QA-pair (P; Y C ) 2 S for which there exists a (P 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) in S such that (P 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) 6 = (P; Y C ) and (P 0 ; Y 0 C 0 ) j = (P; Y C ).
By construction in Step 4b, P; P 0 are non-empty and therefore, there are PF 2 P and PF 0 2 P 0 such that PF = Y (P F 0 ). But then, we must have had QA-pairs (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 e ) and (P F; Y Ce ), where C 0 e C 0 and C e C after step 4a of the algorithm, such that (P F 0 ; Y 0 C 0 e ) j = (P F; Y Ce ). This is contradiction, since at least one of them should have been eliminated in Step 4a. This completes the proof that the set S at the end of the algorithm is compact. Table 2 shows the relation r 0 (Step 2 of Algorithm 3) that is chased by the FD. Since there does not exist any atom mapping from the FD to the tuples of r 0 the FD cannot be applied (see De nition 4.4) and, therefore, r 0 is also the output relation (r 00 ) of chase process.
In
Step 3 r 00 is used to construct S that is the data-dependent disclosure cover of P under FD. S = f(R RANK = Clerk; SALARY = 34; 000]; RANK;SALARY ); (R NAME = Hammer; W:; RANK = Director; EXPERIENCE = 10]; NAME;RANK;EXPERIENCE )g Since S does not disclose any top-secret object the query is answered to the user. 2 
Example 4.2 Now, consider the previous example with the di erence that the employee
Hammer, W is a clerk, that is the third tuple in the Employee relation is <Hammer,W., Clerk, 34,000, 10>. Then the input for Algorithm 3 is the QA-pairs P = f(R RANK = Clerk; SALARY = 34; 000]; RANK;SALARY ); (R NAME = Hammer; W:; RANK = Clerk]; NAME;RANK EXPERIENCE=10 )g In this case, there exists an atom mapping h from the FD to the tuples generated from P (See Table 3) , that is h(r) = Clerk, h(s 1 ) = 34; 000, and h(s 2 ) = 4 . The result of the application of the functional dependency with mapping h is that 4 is replaced with 34; 000. Since the FD cannot be applied again, the nal output of Algorithm 3 is S = f(R NAME = Hammer; W:; RANK = Clerk; SALARY = 34; 000; EXPERIENCE = 10]; NAME;RANK;SALARY;EXPERIENCE )g Since S discloses a top-secret object, the second query is rejected.
5 Data-Independent Disclosure
We start the section with the decidability result of data-independent disclosure.
Theorem 5.1 If queries and constraints do not involve constants then the following problem is decidable: Given a set of queries P = f X1 C1 ; : : : ; Xn Cn g, a set of Horn-clause constraints D, and a query Y C , determine whether P ; 9D Y C .
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is based on the correctness of the algorithm that computes existential disclosure cover that we present in this section. As in the data-dependent case, we need the notion of normal forms.
De nition The following proposition establishes syntactic conditions (that can be e ectively tested) for universal and existential dominance which are used in this section. Proposition 5.3 Universal disclosure is transitive. Let P 1 ; P 2 , and P 3 be sets of queries. P 1 ; 8D P 2^P2 ; 8D P 3 ) P 1 ; 8D P 3 In particular, universal dominance is transitive; i.e., Similarly to the data-dependent case, we need the notion of compact cover.
De nition 5.2 (Data-independent disclosure cover of P under D ) Given P = f X1 C1 ; : : : ;
Xn Cn g a set of queries, the data-independent disclosure cover of P under D, denoted as IDC 9D (P), is a set S of queries Y C that is 1. sound; i.e., for every Y C in S and query Y 0 C 0 , Y C ; 9 Y 0 C 0 ) P ; 9D Y 0 C 0 2. complete; i.e., for every query Y 0 C 0 , P ; 9D Y 0 C 0 implies that there exists Y C in S such that Y C ; 9 Y 0 C 0 3. compact; i.e., for every query Y C 2 S (a) C is non-redundant, that is, no strict subset of C is equivalent to C (b) there does not exist Y 0 C 0 in S that is di erent from Y C and universally dominates Y C Next, we present an algorithm that generates data-independent disclosure cover when neither the selection conditions of the queries nor the database dependencies contain constants. The algorithm is shown in Figure 5 . Algorithm 4 e ectively computes IDC 9D (P); i.e., the algorithm terminates and the computed S is (1) sound, (2) complete, and (3) compact. Proof: Clearly, since the application of dependencies do not generate new symbols, there is only a nite number of distinct tuples that can be generated; therefore the algorithm must terminate. We need to show that the set S computed by the algorithm is (1) sound, (2) complete and (3) compact.
(1) Proof of soundness: It is su cient to show that S constructed in Step 4 (i.e., before
Step 5) of Algorithm 4 is sound. This follows from the following two claims: Let r ex be a relation over R that contains only one tuple t ex such that for each attribute A i 2 R, t ex A i ] = c, where c is a constant. Clearly, r ex satis es D. Let P i = X i C i (r ex ) for i = 1; : : : ; m. Note that since C i contains only equalities among attributes, t ex satis es all of the queries and the answer to the query X i C i is the projection of t ex on attributes X i . Also, PF = Y C (r ex ).
We use Algorithm 3 (Data-dependent disclosure cover algorithm) to show f(P 1 ; X 1 C 1 ); : : : ; (P m ; Xm Cm )g j = D (P F; Y C ). Let r be the relation generated from P 1 ; : : : ; P m at the beginning of Step 2 on Algorithm 3. Note, that at this stage each P i ; i = 1; : : : ; m has already been chased by the dependencies which were generated by the selection conditions of the queries. This application of dependencies is equivalent to the initialization steps 1.a and 1.b of Algorithm 4.
We want to show that if a sequence of dependency applications by Algorithm 4 created a tuple t that was used to generate Y C in S then the same sequence of dependency applications will generate a tuple t 2 r by Algorithm 3 such that PF over Y C can be generated from t. From this and Theorem 4.2 it follows that every Y C 2 S is existentially disclosed from P under D.
To show that the application of dependencies on r will indeed generate the tuple t notice that r and r, the input relation in Step 2 of Algorithm 4, are isomor c with the only di erence that in places where r has a variable, r has the constant c. But then, the chase process executes exactly the same way on both r and r. Let r be the relation generated from P 1 ; : : : ; P m at the beginning of Step 2 of Algorithm 3; i.e., each P i is already chased by dependencies generated from the C i s. Let D 1 ; : : : ; D l the sequence of dependency applications that generated the tuple t which was used to extract (P F; Y 0 C 0 ). We want to show that (1) D 1 ; : : : ; D l can be applied on r, the relation generated in Step 2 of Algorithm 4, and (2) will replace all occurrences of the same null value in the generally corresponding tuples.
2. If D i is a tuple generating dependency that generated the new tuple t = (h(a 1 ); : : : ; h(a n )) in r, when applied on the generally corresponding tuples will generate a tuple ( (h(a 1 )); : : : ; (h(a n ))) = (h(a 1 ); : : : ; h(a n )) in r.
But then, after the application of dependencies on both r and r, there is a generally Example 5.1 This is a detailed illustration of generating a data-independent disclosure cover for the queries, SALARY;RANK and NAME;RANK . The input to Algorithm 4 is: P = f SALARY;RANK ; NAME;RANK g and D = fR RANK = r; SALARY = s 1 ]^R RANK = r; SALARY = s 2 ] ! s 1 = s 2 g Table 4 .a shows that tuples generated in Step 1 of Algorithm 5 from P. Next, the functional dependency in D is applied with mapping h, where h(r) = x, h(s 1 ) = x, and h(s 2 ) = 3 . The result of the application is that 3 is replaced with x (4.b). Since the functional dependency cannot be applied again, S that is generated in Step 4 of Algorithm 4 is: S = f RANK;SALARY ; NAME;RANK;SALARY g Since NAME;RANK;SALARY ; 8 RANK;SALARY , the nal output of Algorithm 1 is S = f NAME;RANK;SALARY g Since S discloses a top-secret object, the second query is rejected.
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For the case with constants we need additional notions, such as weak-transitivity and generalized atom mapping, which we de ne next.
De nition Figure 6 , computes all the queries that are existentially disclosed from a set P of queries by database constraints D.
Theorem 5.3 (Existential disclosure)
Algorithm 5 terminates and its output is a complete and compact set of existentially disclosed queries.
Proof: Algorithm 5 must terminate because the application of dependencies do not generate new symbols and, therefore, only a nite number of distinct tuples and relations of E 0 can be created. We need to show that the set S computed by the algorithm is (1) complete and else, assign a unique null-value j to A j .
2. Construct r to be ft 1 ; : : : ; t m g 3. Construct a weakly transitive binary relation E over the set V of symbols of r and the constants of D as follows:
(a) E contains all re exive pairs of the form x x, i i , and c c. To prove Claim 7, we use the notion of generally corresponding tuples. Initially we de ne general corresponding tuples as follows. Let r 1 denote the relation that was generated from f(P 1 ; X 1 C 1 ); : : : ; (P m ; Xm Cm )g by Algorithm 3 in Step 2 as r 0 , and r 2 denote the relation generated from f X 1 C 1 ; : : : ; Xm Cm g by Algorithm 5 in Step 2 as r. Also, let t i 1 ; : : : ; t i l in r 1 denote the tuples that were generated in Step 1 of Algorithm 3 from the QA-pair (P i ; X i C i ) (i = 1; : : : ; m), and t i in r 2 denote the tuple that was generated from the query Before proving Claim 8, we complete the proof of Claim 7. Let a 1 ; : : : ; a m be the dependency applications on r 1 by Algorithm 3 that generated the tuple t that was used in Step 3 to construct the QA-pair (P F 00 ; Y 00 C 00 ). Let a 1 ; : : : ; a m be the corresponding dependency applications, where each h i (i = 1; : : : ; m) is constructed as de ned in Claim 8.2. We order the dependency applications performed by Algorithm 5 on r 2 , such that a 1 ; : : : ; a m ; : : : ; a n ; i.e., a 1 ; : : : ; a m are completed before any other dependency is applied by Algorithm 5. We can reorder the dependency applications of Algorithm 5, by the following Claim 9, that will be proved after we complete the proof of Claim 7. To complete Claim 7, we have to show that after the query Y C is removed from S in To show that 0 also preserves equalities among the null-values of t i j , notice that Initially we assign unique null-values for all attributes of t i j (j = 1; : : : ; l) that do not already have a constant assigned to. In Step 1.c, Algorithm 3 will equate null-values of t i j only if C i entails their equalities. But then, by construction of t i in Step 1.c of Algorithm 5, t i must contain the same null-value for these attributes, and therefore 0 preserves equalities. This completes the proof that 0 preserves constants and equalities. If d i is a tuple-generating dependency, and a i generated the tuple t = (h i (a 1 ); : : : ; h i (a n )) in r i 1 then a i will generate a tuple t in r i 2 where t = ( i?1 (h i (a 1 )); : : : ; i?1 (h i (a n ))) = i?1 (h i (a 1 ); : : : ; h i (a n )) Then i?1 (t) = t. Clearly 2 ; E 00 ). Since r 00 2 must contain all the tuples of r 2 , and E 00 must contain all of the relations of E, we can apply a 0 1 ; : : : ; a 0 l on (r 00 2 ; E 00 ); i.e., using r 00 2 instead of r 2 and E 00 instead of E. We know, that the applications a 0 1 ; : : : ; a 0 l must produce the tuple or the relation that was not in (r 00
2 ; E 00 ). But this is contradiction, because originally, when (r 00 2 ; E 00 ) was generated, the E-Chase process could terminated only if no more dependency could be applied that resulted in a change. Therefore, (r 0 2 ; E 0 ) and (r 00 2 ; E 00 ) must be equal, and this completes the proof of Claim 9.
(2) Proof of compactness: The compactness property follows directly from the way S is constructed in Step 6 of Algorithm 5.
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The complexity analysis of Algorithm 5 is similar to the one of Algorithm 4 but requires and additional argument. The di erence is that not every iteration of the E-Chase in Step 4 of Algorithm 5 creates a new tuple. Each application of a tuple-generating dependency is bounded by I T , where I is the number of symbols in r and T is the number of attributes of r. Every equality-generating dependency application must add a pair to the binary relation E. Since the size of E is bounded by I 2 , the number of such iterations is bounded by I 2 . In total, the number of iterations is bounded by I T + I 2 , which is O(I T ), the same as the complexity of the chase in Algorithm 4. Therefore, the complexity of Algorithm 5 is the same as the complexity of Algorithm 4, that is O(nT (qT ) (n+1)T ), where q is the number of queries in P. Next we give an example to show how data-independent disclosure cover can be computed.
Example 5.2 This is the detailed illustration of generating the data-independent disclosure cover for the queries, SALARY RANK=Clerk and NAME;RANK EXPERIENCE=10 , which were presented in Example 2.1. The input of Algorithm 5 is: P = f SALARY RANK=Clerk ; NAME;RANK EXPERIENCE=10 g and D = fR RANK = r; SALARY = s 1 ]^R RANK = r; SALARY = s 2 ] ! s 1 = s 2 g Table 5 shows that tuples generated in Step 1 of Algorithm 5 from P. The weakly transitive relation E, contains all re exive pairs of the form s s over the symbols s of Table 5 : Tuples generated in Step 1 of Algorithm 5 from the queries SALARY RANK=Clerk and NAME;RANK EXPERIENCE=10
The result of the application is the extension of E with the pair x 3 . After this, E is closed under weak transitivity, to derive new relations Clerk x 3 and 10 x 3 .
Since the functional dependency cannot be applied again, the nal output of Algorithm 5 is S = f NAME;RANK;SALARY;EXPERIENCE EXPERIENCE=10 g Since S discloses a top-secret object, the second query is rejected.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we attempted a systematic classi cation of the inference problem in terms of (1) data-dependent versus data-independent disclosure, (2) properties of soundness and completeness of disclosure inference algorithms to ensure con dentiality of data while supporting data availability, (3) expressiveness of constraints domains used to represent database and meta-data constraints, and (4) design-time versus query-time inference detection and elimination frameworks. Most importantly, we developed actual inference algorithms for both data-dependent and data-independent disclosures for a highly expressive family of Hornclause constraints. These constraints can express not only functional, multi-valued, and join dependencies (or their combinations) but also meta-data that might be known by users. We conclude by listing some suggestions for further work. This paper focuses on multiple attacks of a single user. However in real life environment it is possible that malicious users share their information to obtain data for which they do not have the proper authorization. With little modi cation, DiMon can protect against collaborating users as well. From the perspective of users' interaction, we distinguish among the following types of attacks: (1) single user attacks, where each user is considered individually, (2) attacks of collaborating users where all of the users are assumed to collaborate with each other, and (3) attacks of collaborating groups of users, where only certain groups of users are assumed to share their information.
Another future direction is to incorporate the problem of data aggregation into the model 10]. The aggregation problem occurs if a certain number (threshold) of data items can be released safely while if the size of the aggregate exceeds this number the security is violated. We believe that database dependencies, especially tuple generating dependencies, should be incorporated to provide secure aggregation control. Note that the inference problem can be viewed as a special type of aggregation problem with zero threshold value. Finally, our model could be extended to handle other kinds of constraints, such as more general arithmetic constraints or embedded generalized dependencies. How to do this with preservation of soundness and completeness of inference algorithms remains an open question.
